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Vol. 4, 2026
De-dollarization Or Digital Dollarization? Tracking Recent Changes In The Global Financial System
Political headlines are reviving talks of de-dollarization. The global financial system is indeed changing, just not in the way the headlines suggest. We track the shifts and find that investors aren’t abandoning the dollar. If anything, the world is moving toward the USD, just in digital form.
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Political headlines are reviving talks of de-dollarization. The global financial system is indeed changing, just not in the way the headlines suggest. We track the shifts and find that investors aren’t abandoning the dollar. If anything, the world is moving toward the USD, just in digital form.
“Is the world de-dollarizing?” That’s one question we’ve heard most from clients this year, especially those based outside the United States.
Worried investors point to the trade-weighted dollar's 3.2% decline against emerging market currencies so far in 2026. What’s more, U.S. Treasuries have sold off throughout the year as U.S. yields climb to multi-decade highs.
To track changes in global markets, we tackle three questions: First, is there evidence of de-dollarization? Second, if portfolios arede-dollarizing, what are the realistic alternatives? Finally, is the dollar actually becoming more entrenched, just in digital form?
Our assessment: the global financial system is changing, but global investors aren't de-dollarizing. Instead, the world is digitallydollarizing.
Global investors aren't de-dollarizing. Instead, the world is digitally dollarizing.
Changing Hands
If the world were fleeing the dollar, the first place it would show up is in the number of foreign holders of U.S. Treasuries.
However, excluding valuation changes, 22 of the 30 countries holding the most Treasuries continued to add to their holdings after Liberation Day in April 2025.
But something is changing, just not what the headlines suggest: Foreign investors are holding more dollars in private accounts than in official ones.
For example, while foreign official holders, mostly central banks, have kept their Treasury holdings roughly flat at around $3.8 trillion, foreign private investors have nearly doubled their holdings since the start of 2020, to a record $5.5 trillion, overtaking official holders in mid-2023 (see Figure 1).
Fig. 1
Shifting Hands
Total Foreign Holdings Of Treasuries, Official Versus Non-Official Holdings
Source: U.S. Treasury
And it’s not just Treasuries. Foreign purchases of U.S. assets continue to ramp up. Japan and South Korea are the best examples.
Japan’s foreign currency reserves have fallen by roughly $200 billion over the past decade, while its Government Pension Investment Fund’s foreign assets rose from about $400 billion to nearly $1 trillion, almost matching the government’s reserves, with 65% of its foreign equities in U.S. stocks (see Figure 2).1 In South Korea, reserves rose modestly while the National Pension Service’s foreign assets increased more than sevenfold (see Figure 2 again). Rising market prices explain only part of the increase: The fund deliberately raised its foreign allocation from about 21% of its portfolio in 2012 to 55% in 2025, with roughly 70% in dollars. China has made the same shift, with its state banks now holding almost as many foreign assets as the People’s Bank of China, around 70% in dollars.2
Fig. 2
Pension Purchases
Change In Currency Reserves Versus Change In Government Pension Investment
Sources: Japan Ministry of Finance, Japan Government Pension Investment Fund, Bank of Korea, Korea National Pension Service
*Foreign currency reserves data as of 2014 and government pension foreign assets data as of 2015 due to data availability
The world didn’t de-dollarize; it simply reallocated dollar assets.
The world didn’t de-dollarize; it simply reallocated dollar assets.
We can infer a few reasons: Foreign official investors increasingly want returns, not just safety. As savings pile up in Asia’s big surplus economies, more of them flow into pension and sovereign wealth funds, which, unlike central banks, chase returns, usually in USD-denominated assets. For China, geopolitics adds another reason to keep U.S. assets off the official books and tucked into ‘private’ offshore custody. Despite the political risk and extra custodial hassle, countries still want to hold U.S. assets (see Did You Know? Old Threats New Again).
Did You Know?
Old Threats New Again
Consider the following excerpt from the Oval Office. A team of Treasury Department economists concludes that the dollar is 10–15% overvalued and proposes the “imposition of trade restrictions.” The president loves the tariff idea, saying the import duty “delights me” as a way of “extracting concessions” from other countries, and promises that the tax will end once the “unfair treatment” does.3 Is this 2025? No, this is 1971! U.S. presidents have chafed at the dollar system's costs for decades and tried to change it more than once. The current administration's actions have more impact on social media, but they are nothing new. Further, the trade threats didn’t materialize as investors feared. After exemptions, deals, and Supreme Court rulings that struck down existing tariffs, the effective tariff rate peaked at about 11% in October 2025 and has since slid to roughly 6.5%, compared to 4% in 2024 before the current administration took office.
What about the increase in central bank gold reserves? After all, the market value of foreign official gold reserves, about $3.5 trillion, now rivals foreign official Treasury holdings of $3.8 trillion.
However, a closer look suggests that while actual purchases have increased, most of the surge reflects valuation changes. If gold prices had continued their pre-2024 trend, official gold reserves would be worth about $2.2 trillion today, roughly $1.3 trillion less than current figures (see Figure 3). Additional gold demand is coming from the private sector, mostly driven by geopolitical motives or inflation hedging.4
Fig. 3
Price Check
Market Value Of Foreign Official Sector Holdings Of Treasuries And Gold
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Federal Reserve, Payden Calculations
Replacement Requirements
Reserve currencies don’t last forever.
Reserve currencies don’t last forever.
Florence’s florin and Venice’s ducat ruled Mediterranean trade for roughly 250 years, until new sea routes to Asia and the Americas moved commerce to Atlantic ports. Then Amsterdam’s guilder financed global trade for more than two centuries, until war and a French invasion in 1795 ended its run. Sterling, backed by the gold standard, dominated for more than a century, until two world wars drained Britain. The U.S. dollar took the crown after World War II.
The pattern is consistent. Every reserve currency in history has had to meet five requirements.
First, the issuing country must uphold the rule of law. Second, it should be a leading economy and trading power, meaning that the world already does business in its currency. Third, the issuing country’s economy and prices must be stable enough that foreigners trust the currency to hold its value, or it must be backed by a precious metal. Fourth, the issuer needs deep, open financial markets so foreign holders can move large amounts of assets freely. Fifth, a reserve currency should be used globally by non-residents to settle transactions and to store savings.5
In the past, reserve status ended when the issuer lost its economic lead. One day the dollar’s reign will end too, but is there a contender ready to take the crown?
Two top runners stand out: the euro, which has long dominated financial markets as a second-place currency, and the Chinese yuan, a rising star powered by China's economic miracle. However, neither satisfies the requirements for reserve status.
The euro area has steady inflation and a well-regulated financial market, making it a popular currency for international debt issuance. However, the euro area’s share of world GDP has been declining, and it hasn’t grown in recent years. The U.S. economy has grown 16.5% since 2019, while France has grown 6% and Germany just 2%. On top of that, the euro falls short in global utilization: the euro invoices 77% of euro-area trade, but less than 3% in Asia-Pacific and the Americas, where the dollar dominates (see Figure 4).6 Further, its bond market remains split across more than 20 sovereign issuers, with no single market matching the depth of U.S. Treasuries.
Fig. 4
Dollar Bills
Average Share Of Trade Invoicing By Region*
Source: Boz, Brüggen, Casas, Georgiadis, Gopinath and Mehl (2025)
*Simple average of the countries in each region, not trade flow weighted
The Chinese yuan has economic heft but lacks capital openness. China has risen to being the world's second-largest economy, but strict capital controls limit liquidity. Unsurprisingly, the yuan accounts for only 1% of international debt issuance and doesn’t crack more than 2% of trade invoicing in any region (see Figures 4 and 5).7 A currency that’s hard to sell or use for trade is a tough sell for a reserve manager.
A currency that’s hard to sell or use for trade is a tough sell for a reserve manager.
Fig. 5
Debt Appetite
Share Of International Debt Securities Issued By Currency
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
What about non-government-issued currency alternatives?
Gold is a proven store of value, but it carries an annualized volatility of 16%, versus 11% for the 10-year Treasury. Also, physical gold is expensive and difficult to hold or move, so few people invoice, trade, or settle payments in gold. And, about half of the world’s central bank gold already sits in vaults in New York and London, so even countries buying gold to reduce their reliance on the West still depend on Western custodians to store and use it. Worse, gold supply is limited: World nominal GDP grows much faster than new gold is mined.8 A reserve asset that can’t keep up with the economy it’s meant to support eventually chokes it.
Few people invoice, trade, or settle payments in gold.
Crypto has been the cycle's best-performing store of value, with Bitcoin up about 600% after inflation since April 2020. But cryptocurrencies are extremely volatile, and the market is still thin: Bitcoin and Ether together trade about $73 billion a day, compared with $1.1 trillion in Treasuries.
Moreover, Bitcoin isn't the crypto asset used for real-world payments. Instead, it is dollar-denominated stablecoins.
Digital Dollars
So the dollar still dominates as it did before, with no important change in the global financial system? Not so fast. Stablecoins are spreading in the opposite direction of de-dollarization.
Stablecoins are digital tokens pegged one-for-one to a currency, usually the U.S. dollar, and backed by reserves such as Treasury bills and cash, which were originally created so traders could park and move value between crypto assets.
In 2025, we predicted that stablecoins would broaden offshore dollar holdings , since they're a much easier way to hold dollars: Anyone with a phone can hold and trade dollars 24 hours a day, seven days a week.9 Stablecoin supply now exceeds $316 billion, more than all offshore Swiss franc holdings (see Figure 6).10
In 2025, we predicted that stablecoins would broaden offshore dollar holdings.
Fig. 6
Offshore Rise
Stablecoin Supply Versus Offshore Swiss Francs
Sources: Artemis, Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Today, we see clear signs of digital dollarization in FX markets.
A recent Bank for International Settlements (BIS) study suggests that dollar-based stablecoins have created a parallel, crypto-based FX market. From 2021 to 2025, more than 70% of the flows into dollar-backed stablecoins came from non-dollar currencies.11 Further, as of the end of 2025, emerging and developing economies held roughly three-quarters of the USDT and USDC.12 In other words, more demand for digital U.S. dollars comes from foreigners exchanging local currencies than from U.S.-based investors.
More interestingly, the study examines the “parity deviation” between the local currency exchange rate with stablecoins and the spot FX market exchange rate. In developed markets, researchers found that the “exchange rate” between developed market fiat currencies and dollar stablecoins closely matched actual FX market exchange rates, as obtaining official dollars is relatively easy (see Figure 7).
Fig. 7
Premium Access
Price Deviation Between Stablecoin And Fiat Currency
Sources: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Aldasoro, Beltrán and Grinberg (2026)
However, households and businesses in emerging markets pay more than the official exchange rate to hold dollars digitally. Put simply, emerging markets are willing to pay a premium to hold dollars when official access is restricted, rationed, or more costly in practice (see Figure 7 again).13 Interestingly, increases in digital dollar holdings also depreciate local currencies in spot FX markets against the U.S. dollar, reinforcing USD strength.14
As a result, USD-pegged stablecoin issuers, which back their stablecoins largely with Treasury bills, bought about $63 billion in additional Treasuries over the last 12 months, second only to the UK among the largest “foreign” buyers.
Still The One
So, de-dollarization or digital dollarization? Recent changes in the global financial system suggest that, rather than de-dollarization, investors are holding more dollar-denominated assets today, just through alternative formats.
Official holders may not be adding Treasuries, but more U.S. assets are moving to private investors. The looming policy concerns that threaten the dollar will continue, but no alternative meets the bar to be considered a reserve asset.
The biggest structural change, the innovation of stablecoins, is extending the dollar’s reach to everyone, especially emerging-market investors facing capital constraints.
De-dollarization is once again denied. Instead, it’s digital dollarization that is underway today.
3. Irwin, D. A. (2012). The Nixon shock after forty years: The import surcharge revisited (NBER Working Paper No. 17749).
4. Weiss, C. (2026, September 3). Why gold didn’t actually overtake Treasury securities as the world’s “favorite” reserve asset (FEDS Notes). Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.4147
5. Galati, G., & Wooldridge, P. (2006). The euro as a reserve currency: A challenge to the pre-eminence of the US dollar? (BIS Working Papers No. 218).
6. Boz, E., Brüggen, A., Casas, C., Georgiadis, G., Gopinath, G., & Mehl, A. (2025). Patterns of invoicing currency in global trade in a fragmenting world economy (IMF Working Paper No. 25/178). International Monetary Fund.https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229024495.001
7. Bank for International Settlements. (2025). Debt securities statistics: International debt securities [Data set]. Retrieved November 16, 2026, fromhttps://data.bis.org/topics/DSS
9. Payden & Rygel. (2025). "The New And Improved Dollar Standard? Stablecoins And The Onboarding Of The World To The U.S. Dollar System." Point of View, Vol. 1, 2025, article 3.
10. Artemis Analytics. (2026). Stablecoin supply [Data set]. Retrieved September 9, 2026, fromhttps://app.artemis.xyz/stablecoins; Bank for International Settlements. (2026). Global liquidity indicators [Data set]. Retrieved October 27, 2026, from https://data.bis.org/topics/GLI
12. Reuter, M. (2026). International stablecoin flows, capital controls and currency crises (IMF Working Paper No. 2026/211).https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229061612.001
This material reflects the firm’s current opinion and is subject to change without notice. Sources for the material contained herein are deemed reliable but cannot be guaranteed. This material is for illustrative purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or an offer to sell or buy any security. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Point of View articles may not be reprinted without permission. We welcome your comments and feedback at editor@payden.com.
This material has been approved by Payden & Rygel Global Limited which is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. This material has been approved by Payden Global SIM S.p.A.. which is authorised and regulated by CONSOB.